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Abstract 
The scope of this paper lies in the study of the trust factor within electronic transactions. 
Considerable importance has recently been given to this factor since the Net limits direct 
interpersonal relations and often does not even allow recognition of the opposing party. 
The risks of electronic commerce are also often highlighted, demonstrating that the 
international legal mechanisms currently in place are inefficient. Using this assumption 
as a starting point, the main risks of electronic markets will be highlighted and the 
sources of trust proposed in the literature will be discussed. The main objective, however, 
will be to analyze the extralegal mechanisms- in particular the creation of reputation 
trust. 
1.  Introduction 
Parties undertaking an electronic transaction expose themselves to a level of risk that is 
directly proportional to the amount of information available to each side. Economic 
systems typically exhibit two situations (Klang, 2001): 1. perfect information where both 
sides possess full relevant information needed to pursue the transaction, 2. informational 
asymmetry in which there is an unequal distribution of information. Real economic 
conditions are more typically characterized by the second scenario (Tan and Thoen, 
2002). Ackelof (1997) elaborates on this concept with the classic example of the used car 
market: the seller has information that the potential buyer does not possess, such as the 
real or qualititative value of the car; the buyer, on the other hand, can only hypothesize 
the value of the car in proportion to the time and evidence available to him, and because 
the latter are limited, the actual selling price will not completely reflect the true car value. 
 Information asymmetries have a direct effect on the degree of risk since they leave space 
for opportunistic maneuvering on both sides and reduce control over the final outcome of 
the transaction (Williamson, 1975 and 1985) 
The problem associated with informational asymmetries becomes even more critical in e-
commerce where relationships are digitalized and a physical separation exists between 
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parties (Bons et al., 2001). The screen created by the electronic medium- which inevitably 
separates the parties involved in the transaction- limits direct interpersonal relationships 
and recognition of the other party. Returning to Ackelof’s example, the electronic 
transaction does not allow a degree of verification necessary for filling informational 
gaps, and as a result opportunistic behavior can frequently manifest with the introduction 
of incorrect or devious information. These baseline conditions have led some authors 
such as Tapscott et al (2000) to state that the generation of trust is the sine qua non 
condition for the proper functioning of a digital economy. Others have pointed to the lack 
of legal mechanisms that could guarantee trust on the Internet. Klang (2001), for 
example, believes that legal enforcement at the international level is inefficient, while Ba 
et al (2002) have demonstrated that the legal system is incomplete in e-commerce. 
The paper is a theoretical analysis with the objective of understanding the extralegal 
mechanisms necessary for the trust generation - particularly with respect to reputation as 
a value asset in electronic markets. Despite the theoretical contributions on the concept of 
trust permit an analysis of both B2C and B2B relations, the paper principally used 
business-to-consumer empirical evidence which allowed the formulation of the first 
hypotheses on reputation mechanisms. These hypotheses can be verified in more depth in 
future work related to B2B operators. 
The underlying assumption of this work is the necessity for trust in electronic 
transactions- this is highlighted in the second section, showing how the Internet 
accentuated information asymmetries. The third section recalls the primary theoretical 
contributions on the concept of trust, placing attention on the two main schools of 
thought: the economic one that points to the institutions as the main mechanism in trust 
generation (Coase, 1984; Dunn J., 1988; Williamson O.E., 1993) and the sociological one 
that refers to social relations (Granovetter M., 1985; Shapiro S.P., 1987; Fukuyama F. 
1995). In the fourth and the fifth section, the attention then turns to extralegal 
mechanisms and, once reputation has been established as a value asset in electronic 
markets, the factors for its generation will be discussed.  
2. Risks in Electronic Transaction 
In Table 1 the conditions of guarantee required by a seller and buyer to conduct a 
transaction, according to Froomkin (1996), are shown. In face-to-face relations, tangible 
aspects of the exchange allow these guarantees to be provided. The physical presence of a 
sales point favors information authentication on the product and who is selling it. The 
execution of the transaction phases can be demonstrated by the exchange of paper 
documents (confirmation, integrity and recourse). Receipts, as well as documents coming 
from third parties (such as checks, receipt of a POS system or credit card) can confirm 
payment; delivery receipts show that a good has been received. Such documents reduce 
the possibility of a party denying the happening of actual physical events and furnishes 
guarantees against a buyer’s potential refusal to pay or denials of receipt of the good. 
When the transaction occurs over the Internet, several problems enter into play that are 
related to the digitalization of the relationship. The first problem, cited by Ba and Pavlou 
(2002), is related to authentication and certification problems deriving from the 
anonymity of the transaction participants. In electronic auctions, for example, an e-mail is 
all that allows identification of the buyer and seller, and such addresses are freely 
available from an Internet Service Provider (ISP). The possibility of hiding one’s identity 
creates a strong informational asymmetry that does not allow the opposing party to know 
who is hiding behind a false email. The informational gap that is created leaves space for 
opportunistic maneuvering that can lead to fraud and unethical behavior. 
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Another problem is related to uncertainty regarding product quality and services (eg. 
delivery). In e-commerce, the buyer visualizes a good as shown on a Web page and can 
not verify the reported information, but has to trust the declarations of the sellers (Fung 
and Lee, 1999). Internet represents a barrier that creates an informational asymmetry 
between seller and buyer. 
 
Table 1: Merchant and Buyer Desires (source: Froomkin, 1996). 
Merchant’s Desires 
Authentication. Knowing the buyer’s identity before making the sale may assist in proof 
of order and guarantee of payment.  
Certification. The merchant may need proof that the buyer possesses an attribute required 
to authorize the sale.  
Confirmation. The merchant needs to be able to prove any third party involved in the 
transaction that the customer did indeed authorize the payment.  
Nonrepudiation. The merchant wants protection against the customer’s unjustified denial 
that he placed the order, or that the good were not delivered. 
Payment. The merchant need assurance that payment will be made. This can be achieved 
by having payment before sale, at time of sale, or by provision of a payment guarantee. 
Anonymity. In same case, the merchant may want to control tha amount of transactional 
information disclosed to customer. 
Buyer’s Desires 
Authentication. Confirming the seller’s identity prior to purchase helps ensure that goods 
will be genuine, and that service or warranties will be provided as advertised. 
Integrity. Protection against unauthorized payments.  
Recourse. Comfort that there is recourse if the seller fails to perform or deliver. 
Confirmation. A receipt. 
Privacy. Control over the amount of buyer/transactional information disclosed to third 
parties. 
Anonymity. Control over the amount of transactional information disclosed to merchant. 
 
As a result, e-commerce has the inevitable effect of increasing asymmetries already in 
existence in traditional commercial interactions. The lack of complete information on the 
opposing party and on the sold product creates an informational gap that leaves space for 
what Williamson (1985) defines opportunistic behavior amongst relevant parties. Mishra 
et al. (1998) illustrate examples of opportunistic behavior, such as the introduction of 
false or incomplete information on a product, or deviations from contractual obligations. 
Given that, Web interractions have a higher level of baseline risk with respect to 
traditional exchanges: analysis of the trust factor and how to generate it becomes 
important. This is the only way to limit risk and ensure low transaction costs (Jarvenpaa 
& Tractinsky, 1999).  
In the following section, several contributions to the theory of trust will be recalled- 
starting with a definition of the term and then proceeding to a classification of the main 
mechanisms that contribute to Trust generation. 
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3. Dimensions of Trust 
In the literature we may find a series of definitions of Trust1, summarized by Gambetta 
(1988): “There is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can 
summarized as follows: trust… is a particular level of the subjective probability with 
which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action… When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly 
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not 
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation 
with him.” As expressed by Gambetta, trust has a strong subjective component linked to 
how the individual perceives the reality in which he operates and the actions of the parties 
he interacts with. The way in which agent ‘A’ evaluates the performance of agent ‘B’ is 
the type of study that permits us to understand the trust factor and its generative 
mechanisms. There are two schools of thought, however, that approach the issue from 
different perspectives: the economic standpoint and the sociological one. 
The first considers trust from the point of view of the environment in which the 
transacting party operates, and the institutions that regulate his behavior. Coase (1984) 
states that human action is guided by the constraints set by institutions (laws, norms, 
government organs, banks and other intermediaries). This view brings Williamson (1993) 
to consider trust as the analysis of these constraints and the risks associated with the 
execution of the transaction (calculative trust). According to the economic school, the 
subjective evaluation of ‘B’’s actions is done through an analysis of the institutions that 
constrain the former’s actions. Contract clauses, institutions that control and supervise, 
norms and intermediaries supporting the transaction provide the necessary guarantees for 
“A” to operate within an economic system. 
 
Table 2: Trust Generation in Economic Transaction 
 
The second school of thought -the sociological one- places greater emphasis on the 
individual person behavior and character, as well as interpersonal relationships and group 
interactive dynamics (Bigley and Pierce 1998). ‘A’ is studied as a member of a social 
system within which he has a series of relationships, or ties, of varied nature (sentimental, 
                                                     
1 For a wide explanation about Trust definition see McKnight D.H. and Chervany N.L. (1996). 
A defintion of 
Trust 
Trust dimension School Mechanisms for Trust 
Generation 
Calculative 
(Coase,1984; 
Williamson, 1993) 
Economic Institutions control and 
guarantee economic 
transactions. Laws, norms and 
relevant official bodies 
constrain human behavior. 
Reputation (Granovetter, 
1985; Zucker, 1986; 
Shapiro, 1987) 
Economic/ 
sociological 
Interaction amongst parties 
generates (or destroys) 
reputation, which in turn 
generates (or destroys) Trust. 
“Trust is a 
particular level of 
the subjective 
probability with 
which an agent 
assesses that 
another agent or 
group of agent will 
perform a particular 
action” (Gambetta, 
1988) Community (Deming, 
1986; Shapiro, 1987; 
Bigley and Pearce, 
1998) 
Sociological Social relationships create a 
sense of belonging, moral 
obligations and value sharing 
that are the basis of deep trust. 
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kinship or belonging). Institutions are only cited when comparing the individual to 
abstract systems such as law, security o health (Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). Such 
studies have been applied within firms in the organization of human resources and in 
economic interactions. Fukuyama (1995), for example, describes company networks as 
based upon reciprocal moral obligations, conventions and social norms. Trust, from this 
point of view, is indicated by Adler (2000) as a functioning principle of hybrid 
coordination forms, set between the markets and hierarchies. While markets are based on 
price and hierarchies on authority, these intermediary forms are based on trust. 
Out of these two schools of thought, three dimensions of the Trust variable emerge- all 
generally linked to the economic or sociological approach (see Tab.2). Calculative Trust, 
Reputation Trust and Community Trust are the three interpretive models necessary for a 
study of trust in economic transactions.  
The objective of this work therefore becomes an analysis of the extralegal mechanisms of 
trust generation, and will continue with an in-depth study of the mechanisms of reputation 
while abandoning the approach of trust generation through legal constraints. 
4. Extralegal Trust Generation Mechanisms in the Internet Age 
Zucker (1986) specifies extralegal mechanisms as interaction repetitiveness in a social 
system. Part ‘A’ performs a transaction with part ‘B’ and comes to understand the latter’s 
behavior and can express a judgment that will enhance or diminish B’s reputation. In an 
economic system, internal interactions create (or destroy) the parties’ reputation, 
generating (or destroying) trust. Reputation Research Network Community, cite in his 
web-cite, the three benefit of reputation mechanism 
(http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/): 
• helping people decide who to trust;  
• encouraging people to be more trustworthy;  
• discouraging those who are not trustworthy from participating. 
 
Each party tends to initiate relationships with entities whose behavior or reputation is well 
established (Granovetter, 1985; Shapiro, 1987). The reputation factor is an asset of 
elevated value since it fluidifies the transaction and lessens the importance attributed to 
contractual clauses (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). 
The reputation of an operator allows us to evaluate his future behavior and therefore 
understand whether he is trustworthy. Smith (1910) states that “it is not from the 
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from 
their regards to their own interest.” The point made here is that the regulation of 
transaction occurs not through law but through the market mechanisms of trust and 
reputation (Klang, 2001). Parties whose actions do not support their original promises 
will develop an untrustworthy reputation and will no longer be able to operate. 
Reputation creates increased fluidity in economic transactions and serves as a regulator of 
opportunistic behavior. It is in the interest of each party to behave correctly since 
incorrect actions are punished by a loss of reputation and eventually by a potential exit 
from the market. Obviously, these effects can occur where parties know each other and 
each other’s actions are verifiable. These mechanisms lose their efficacy in larger and 
more complex realms, such as a large metropolis or a national geographic area. In this 
case, unethical behavior has less resonance and the diffusion of distorted information is 
not immediately verifiable or confrontable between parties. As a result, one would expect 
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that the mechanisms of reputation are further dampened in digital environments: the 
world wide electronic markets and the relative anonymity of the parties involved make it 
difficult to judge the trustworthiness of a counterpart. 
In reality, however, certain facts point in a different direction. Case studies such as 
Amazon.com, Dell.com and eBay.com clearly show that creation of reputation has 
consolidated their online leadership. Amazon comes to mind to any consumer that wishes 
to purchase books through the Internet and despite the fact that a variety of operators have 
attempted imitations, its repuation has allowed it to defend its leadership position (85% 
share of online book sales). Dell.com retains 14.4% of the personal computer market 
(second only to the colossal Compaq-hp, at 17.2%,), uniquely through online sales. Even 
in this case the client trusts in the reputation of the Dell brand which guarantees the 
correct execution of the electronic transaction. Finally, eBay has over 42.4 milion 
subscribed users (eBay announcements, 2002), making it the best known reference point 
for online auctions. eBay’s fame generates trust for the user who participates in Internet 
auctions even if only done for the first time2.  
In addition to these trends, it should also be noted that Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) and 
Shneiderman (2000) are agreed in concluding that the successful online sales 
performance is linked to the reputation of the operator and the latter’s dimensions. 
The tendency to favor well-known business entities, whose performances in commercial 
transactions are known, is also favored by the lack of other forms of guarantees. 
Consumer trust in brand reputation is based on the lack of other mechanisms of control 
over the execution of electronic transactions. Legislation associated with e-commerce is 
still not clear and, to worsen matters, is not homogeneous across nations. In the European 
Union, for example, several years are still required before all member states assign the 
same value to an electronic document as that given to a its paper counterpart. At the 
moment, each country uses procedures and different documents to ascertain the execution 
of a transaction (es. the order itself, invoicing, delivery). Not even the legal value of these 
is common across the world- often creating controversies (Tan and Thoen, 2002). Klang 
(2001) recognizes that an appeal to international law is not efficient due to the lack of 
agreements. Ba et al. (2002b) suggests three reasons why the legal system is incomplete: 
1.“legal regulation and control cannot keep pace with the development of electronic 
commerce”; 2.“the extant laws in conventional commerce might not be strictly 
enforceable in electronic commerce”; 3.“resorting to legal enforcement in elctronic 
commerce might be impracticably expensive or even impoossible for micro-payment 
transactions”. The same authors also refer to extralegal mechanisms as a needed factor for 
the performance of electronic transactions. 
If we start with these assumptions, it then becomes imperative to understand how the 
cited operators have generated reputation trust to the point that the consumer has chosen 
to ignore the risks associated with electronic transactions. To this end, reputation trust 
may serve as a critical component of a firm’s business strategy (Urban et al, 2000). 
5. Reputation as a Value Asset 
In a variety of contexts, when one refers to the Internet, the term virtual is often 
introduced: virtual economy, virtual markets, virtual transaction. Online business models 
tend to virtually replicate real physical systems, such as traditional marketplaces. 
                                                     
2 Other examples which demonstrate the importance of repuation in the digital economy can be viewed at the 
Reputation Reserach Network Community homepage: (http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/). 
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Operators tend to digitally reproduce those mechanisms that permit regularity of 
exchange and which Klang (2001) defines as the market mechanism of trust and 
reputation. 
The examples of Internet companies in the previous section show how reputation is a 
highly valuable asset for those operating online and even has strategic impact (Urban et 
al, 2000)3. What follows is an attempt to summarize the factors that influence the 
reputation of online operators through both empirical evidence as well as theory proposed 
in the literature. 
Size  
Jarvenpaa et al. (1999) developed and tested a theoretical model about the causes and 
consequences of trust in an Internet store. Their model suggests that customers’ 
evaluations of a store’s reputation and size affect their trust in the store itself. Size in 
virtual word is perceived as the presence that the entity has on the Web-this can be 
influenced by advertising banners on other sites, the number of subscribed users, page 
views and links that lead to the web site. The 42 million subscribed users of e-Bay, the 
links to the site www.ebay.com in different e-shops and its international presence specific 
to each country (eg . www.eBay.de, www.eBay.it), offer a glimpse of its size. 
Also partnerships and acquisitions allow for a more powerful online presence. In 2001 
Ebay acquired i-bazar- its primary European competitor- thereby consolidating its 
position as the major online trading community (http://www.shareholder.com/ebay/news/ 
20010221-33047.htm). By typing in www.ibazar.com one gets directly linked to the eBay 
homepage. 
Relationship to the Non-Virtual World 
Generally business entities that also have a physical presence- even just a certain 
operational aspects such as distribution or delivery, generate a greater level of 
trustworthiness towards the consumer, with a corresponding increase in reputation. 
Brick-and-mortar stores help to build trust by providing a positive and tangible shopping 
experience, a place to return unwanted purchases, a place to examine the goods and a 
brand with which consumers are already familiar. As these advantages become more 
widely acknowledged, some pure e-shop may become hybrids. Etrade and Gateway have 
started to provide physical outlets, for example. 
Network Systems of Relationships  
Several authors believe that the source of reputation trust lies in belonging to a network 
system of relationships (Granovetter, 1985; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
Reputation can be enhanced by creating a connection with established and well-known 
entities. The client-supplier relationship also falls within this realm, where advantage is 
derived, for example, by being the supplier of an accredited multinational company. 
Dell.com, for example, has also consolidated its reputation by serving as a supplier to 
government institutes and with U.S. public administration. 
                                                     
3 Reputation importance is highlight in reputation systems research community on the web, where people 
study very specific mechanisms for collecting feedback from transaction parties in order to compute levels of 
reputation (http://databases.si.umich.edu/reputations/). 
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Palmer et al (2000) believe that relationships with intermediaries play an important role in 
generating reputation trust. A company can take generate such trust by outsourcing its 
payment processes to a secure and reliable bank, or by requesting the certification of 
processes through a known entity. 
Shankar et al (2002) also believe that online trust can be impacted through online 
partnerships. Another example is the online alliance between AOL and Autoweb, an 
online automobile selection servce. Being the preferred autoselection service on AOL, 
Autoweb now stands to gain a higher level of trust from its stakeholders than when it 
previously wasn’t linked to AOL. Obviously these strategies must be done with care 
because, in this scenario, AOL may be perceived as biased, thereby losing a certain 
degree of trust among its consumers. 
Finally, another interesting case is that of Trusted Third Parties (TTT) that serves as a 
security guarantee by placing their sigil on the homepages of Internet sites4.  TTT’s sigils 
increase the reputation on an online business entity, guaranteeing its users that its 
behavior is ethical and conforming to the certification principles. Hoffman et al (1999) 
considers user privacy policies an important factor in reputation: if the user perceives that 
his data is being used for other motives (eg commercial benefit), the professional image 
of the entity would be tarnished. 
Feedback 
Shapiro and Varian (1999) use the term positive feedback to explain first-mover 
dynamics: the first to enter a market can take advantage of its dominant position, thereby 
sparking a virtuous cycle that continues to consolidate its leadership. From the point of 
view of reputation trust, positive evaluations increase reputation as well as market 
position, sparking such a virtuous cycle; conversely, negative evaluations promote 
negative feedback that can weaken the company. 
In electronic markets, the identification of participants through digital certificates allows 
an evaluation to be made on the opposing commercial party. Ba et al (2002b) have 
shown- through the use of game theory- that feedback mechanisms regulate the market, 
and in fact “the most utilitarian course of action for a market participant is to behave 
honestly”. 
eBay has created a feedback forum, where each buyer can give a score to the seller at the 
end of each auction. The users with the highest score are classified as PowerSellers: they 
are exemplary members who are held to the highest standards of professionalism, having 
achieved and maintained a 98% positive feedback rating and an excellent sales 
performance record. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper- by recalling transaction cost theory- has pointed to the high risks present in e-
commerce. Informational asymmetries are amplified by the electronic medium, thereby 
accentuating opportunistic behaviour that is particularly hazardous for those buying and 
selling through the Internet. Starting with this assumption, we have attempted to 
                                                     
4 The Industry Standard (1999) has ranked TRUSTe4 and BBB Online4  as the prime “security brands” capable of 
generating Trust on the Net. Another well-known brand is VeriSign which certifies safe data transmission (Palmer et al., 
2000). 
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understand how some business models have managed to generate trust for those operating 
on the Internet and be successful. 
The inefficiency of legal mechanisms for the proper functioning of electronic markets is 
highlighted in recent studies (Klang, 2001; Tan e Thoen, 2002; Ba et al., 2002), and 
serving as an obstacle in the creation of Institutional Trust. The same authors also refer to 
extralegal mechanisms as necessary for the performance of electronic transactions. 
The importance of Reptutational Trust thus becomes evident and allows the psychological 
barrier created by the risk of electronic transactions to be overcome. The final part of this 
work attempts to highlight the factors that allow one to create reputation online. From 
what has emerged it is clear that the size of the business entity, the network system of 
relationships/partnerships and the connection to the physical world are of paramount 
importance. Finally, the creation of systems of online feedback allow the replication of 
reputation mechanisms found in traditional offline marketplaces. Entities that operate 
ethically obtain positive evaluations and consolidate their position, while those that act 
unethically obtain negative evaluations with strong penalizing effects. 
Finally, it is important to note that reputation is also highly important for the dynamics 
that manifest in digital economy. In the particularly turbulent environment of the Net, 
where it is easy to start a business and easy to fail-and where it is difficult to identify the 
parties involved- reputation becomes a highly valuable asset. 
References 
Ackerlof G., 1970, ‘The market for lemons: quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanisms’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.84. 
Adler P., 2001, ‘Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future 
of Capitalism’, Organization Science, vol.12, n.2. 
Armstrong A. and Hagel J., 1996, ‘The real value of on-line communities’, Harvard 
Business Review, vol.74, n.3. 
Ba S., Pavlou P.A., 2002a, ‘Evidence of the Effect of Trust Building Technology in 
Electronic Markets: Price Premium and Buyer Behaviour’, MIS Quarterly, 
vol.26, n.3. 
Ba S., Whinston A.B., Zhang H., 2002b, ‘Building Trust in online auction markets 
through an economic incentive mechanism’, accepted for pubblication in 
Decision Support System, march 2002. 
Bailey J.P. (ed.), 1998, Intermediation and Electronic Merkets: Aggregation and Pricing 
in Internet Commerce, Ph.D Thesis, Stanford University. 
Bailey J.P. and Bakos Y., 1997, ‘An Exploratory Study of the Emerging Role of 
Electronic Intermediaries’, International Journal of Electronic Commerce vol.1, 
n.3. 
Beveridge A.A., 1985, ‘Credit and community change: A case study during early United 
States industrialization.’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Sociological Association, Washington. 
Bigley G.A. and Pearce J.L., 1998, ‘Straining for shared meaning in organization science: 
Problems of trust and distrust’, Academic Management Review, vol.23, n.3. 
Trust Generation through Extralegal Mechanisms: Reputation as a Valued Asset in eMarkets 
 295 
Bons R.W.H., Lee R.M. and Wagenaar R.W., 1997, ‘Designing Trustworthy Trade inter-
organizational trade procedures for open electronic commerce’, Proceeding of the 
10th International Bled Electronic Commerce Conference, Bled, Slovenia. 
Bons R.W.H., Dignum F., Lee R.M., Tan Y., 2001, ‘A formal specification of automated 
auditing of trustworthy trade procedures for open electronic commerce’, in 
Castelfranchi C. e Tan Y. Eds., Trust and deception in virtual societies, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Boyd J., 2002, ‘In Community we Trust: Online Security Communication at eBay’, 
Journal of Computer Mediated Communication, vol.7, n.3. 
Chiles T.H. and McMackin J.F., 1996, ‘Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and 
transaction cost economics’, Academy of Management Review, vol.21.  
Coase R.H., 1984, ‘The New Instittuional Economics’, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics, vol.229. 
Deming W.E., 1986, Out of the Crisis, Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Center for Advanced Engineering Study.  
Dunn J., 1988, ‘Trust and Political Agency’, in Gambetta D. (ed.), Trust: Making and 
Breaking Cooperative Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford UK. 
Fram, E.H., 2002, ‘E-commerce survivors: Finding value amid broken dreams’, Business 
Horizons, Luglio-Agosto. 
Froomkin A.M., 1996, ‘The essential role of trusted third parties in Electronic 
Commerce’, Oregon Law Review, vol.75. 
Fukuyama F., 1995, Trust: The social virtues and the creation of the prosperity, Free 
Press, New York. 
Fung R. and Lee M., 1999, ‘EC-Trust: Exploring the Antecedent Factors’, Proceeding of 
the Americas Conference on Information Systems. 
Gambetta D., 1988, Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, Basil Blakwell, 
Oxford UK. 
Granovetter M., 1985, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problam of 
embeddedness’ America Journal of Sociology, vol.91, n.3.  
Hoffman D.L., Novak T.P. and Peralta, M., 1999, ‘Building consumer trust online’, 
Communications of the ACM, vol.42, n.4. 
Houston D.A., 2001, ‘Trust in the Networked Economy: Doing Business in Web Time’ 
Business Horizons, vol.4, n.2. 
Jarvenpaa S.L. and Tractinsky N., 1999, ‘Consumer Trust in an Internet Store: A Cross-
Cultural Validation’, Journal of Computer Mediated Communications, vol.5, n.2. 
Jarvenpaa S. L., Tractinsky N., & Vitale M., 2000, ‘Consumer trust in an Internet store’, 
Information Technology Management, v.1.  
Klang M., 2001, ‘Who do you Trust? Beyond encryption, secure e-business’, Decision 
Support System, n.31. 
Mayer R.C., Davis J.H. and Schoorman, F.D., 1995, ‘An integrative model of organizational trust.’ 
Academy of Management Review, vol.20, n.3. 
McKnight D.H., Chervany N.L, 1996, ‘The meaning of Trust’, MISRC Working Paper Series 96-
04. 
Mishra D.P., Heide J.B. and Cort S.G., 1998, ‘Information Asymmetry and Level of Agency 
Relationship’, Journal of Marketing Research, n.35. 
Matteo Di Biagi 
 296 
Palmer J.W., Griffith D., 1998, ‘An emerging web site design model for marketing.’ 
Communications of the ACM, vol.41, n.3. 
Scott, J.E., 1998, ‘Organizational Knowledge and the Intranet’, Decision Support 
Systems, vol. 23, n.1. 
Shankar V., Urban G.L., Sultan F., 2002, “Online trust: a stakeholders perspective, 
concepts, implications, and future directions”, Strategic Information System, n11. 
Shapiro S., 1987, ‘The social control of impersonal trust’, American Journal of Sociology, 
vol.93, n.3. 
Shapiro C. and Varian H.R., 1999, Information Rules-a strategic guide to the network 
economy, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Shneiderman B., 2000, ‘Designing Trust into online Experiences’, Communications of the 
ACM, vol.43 n.12. 
Simon H.A., 1991, ‘Organizations and Markets’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.5, n.2. 
Tan Y.H. and Thoen W., 2002, ‘Formal Aspects of a generic model of trust for electronic 
commerce’, Decision Support System, article in press.  
Tapscott D., Ticoll D., and Lowy A., 2000, Digital Capital: Harnessing the Power of 
Business Webs, Harvard Business School Press, Boston. 
Urban G.L., Sultan F., Qualls W., 2000, ‘Making Trust the center of your Internet 
Strategy’. Sloan Management Review, Fall, pp.39-48.  
Williamson O.E, 1985, The economic Institution of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting, The Free Press, New York. 
Williamson O.E., 1975, Markets and Hierarchies: analysis and antitrust implications, 
Free Press, New York. 
Williamson O.E., 1993, ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’, Journal of 
Law & Economics, vol.36. 
Zucker L.G., 1986, ‘Production of Trust: Institutional Source of Economic Structure, 
1849-1920’, Research in Organizational Behaviour, vol.8. 
 
 
 
